A Machine-Synesthetic Approach To DDoS Network Attack Detection by Monakhov, Yuri et al.
A Machine-Synesthetic Approach To DDoS
Network Attack Detection ?
Yuri Monakhov, Oleg Nikitin, Anna Kuznetsova, Alexey Kharlamov, and
Alexandr Amochkin
Vladimir State University, 600000 Vladimir, Russia unklefck@gmail.com
Abstract. In the authors opinion, anomaly detection systems, or ADS,
seem to be the most perspective direction in the subject of attack de-
tection, because these systems can detect, among others, the unknown
(zero-day) attacks. To detect anomalies, the authors propose to use ma-
chine synesthesia. In this case, machine synesthesia is understood as an
interface that allows using image classification algorithms in the problem
of detecting network anomalies, making it possible to use non-specialized
image detection methods that have recently been widely and actively
developed. The proposed approach is that the network traffic data is
projected into the image.It can be seen from the experimental results
that the proposed method for detecting anomalies shows high results in
the detection of attacks. On a large sample, the value of the complex
efficiency indicator reaches 97%.
Keywords: data networks, image recognition, availability, attack detec-
tion
1 Introduction
One of the methods of ensuring network availability is employing the network
anomaly detection mechanisms.Before defining an anomaly, it is necessary to
figure out what is considered a normal state. We consider the state of system
”normal” (or ”functionally viable”) when it performs all the functions assigned
to it. Therefore, an anomaly is a state where the behavior of the system does not
correspond to the clearly established characteristics of normal behavior [1]. Im-
plementing the prompt detection mechanisms for such anomalies will sufficiently
increase the chances of an effective response to network availability violation in-
cidents.
Known network anomalies are so diverse they cannot be categorized using a
single classification. There is a clearly laid distinction, however, between active
and passive, external and internal, intentional and unintentional anomalies, etc.
Since these distinctions do not reflect all the characteristics of the phenomenon
under study, the author [2] proposed a classification of anomalies based upon
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the impact object, i.e. an information system consisting of hardware, software
and a network infrastructure.
According to the chosen approach, network anomalies can be divided into
two main groups: node malfunctions and security breaches. Node malfunctions
include hardware faults, design and configuration errors, software errors, and
hardware performance issues. Network security breaches include the following
anomalies: network scanning, denial of service, malware activity, distribution of
network worms, exploitation of vulnerabilities, traffic analyzers (sniffers), and
network modifiers (packet injections, header spoofing etc).
The largest financial damage to telecom operators is caused by denial of
service incidents. DoS attacks, in turn, can be divided into two types: inad-
vertently caused ”attacks” (design errors and network settings, a small amount
of dedicated computing resources, a sharp increase in the number of calls to a
network resource) and attacks due to deliberate actions, e.g. UDP flood, TCP
SYN flood, Smurf ICMP broadcast flood and ICMP flood. Deliberate attacks
pose the greatest threat, as it is more difficult to mitigate them effectively and
potentially they can lead to large losses.
Analysis of research results published in [3,4,5,6,7,8], as well as reports of
major information security systems developers, showed that there is no single
effective algorithm for denial-of-service attack detection and mitigation. Usually,
vendows offer an expensive solution implementing a hybrid algorithm based on
signature search methods and blacklisting attacker node IP addresses as a form
of mitigation. An example is the ATLAS system from Arbor, Ltd. Thus, the
problem of developing tools for distributed DoS attack detection with a high
degree of efficiency remains relevant.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, a review of the
existing approaches for detecting anomalies is provided; Section 3 discusses the
proposed approach, specifically, a strategy of representing traffic metadata into
an image and an algorithm for classifying the obtained image are presented; in
Section 4, experimental results are provided; Section 5 concludes the work and
gives an outlook for further studies.
2 Existing approaches
In the authors’ opinion, anomaly detection systems, or ADS, seem to be the most
perspective direction in the subject of attack detection, because these systems
can detect, among others, the unknown (zero-day) attacks. Almost all the models
for detecting anomalies described in the literature can be divided into:
a) based on a behavioral pattern storage [9,10]. The program implementation of
this approach needs to be compiled into the operating system kernel, which
is difficult to the point of practical impossibility (e.g. in trusted computing
systems). In addition, the constant presence of a monitoring component leads
to an overall slowdown of the entire system by approximately 4 - 50 percent;
b) frequency-based [11,12]. Common drawbacks of frequency methods are their
poor adaptability, since the reference values of frequencies are determined
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once by training sets or according to expert data. Moreover, these methods
are usually ”stateless”, i.e. the order of feature appearance is not taken into
account;
c) based on some type of a neural network classifier [13,14,15,16,17]. The disad-
vantage of many neural networks is their poor fitness to process non-ordered
datasets. Introducing an artificial order on a set of element values will only
distort the picture, since the neural network will recalculate weights accord-
ing to the proximity of numerical values;
d) based on a finite automata (state machine) synthesis [6,9,18,19,20]. The main
disadvantage of this approach is the complex process of building a state
machine by parsing the attack scenario. In addition, there are restrictions
on the types of attack algorithms that can be described by regular grammars;
e) other, special: based on Bayesian networks [21], genetic algorithms [22], etc.
Most of the works offer only the basic idea, the algorithm, often unsuitable
for practical use.
3 Proposed approach
To detect anomalies, the authors propose to use machine synesthesia. In this
case, machine synesthesia is understood as an interface that allows using image
classification algorithms in the problem of detecting network anomalies, making
it possible to use non-specialized image detection methods that have recently
been widely and actively developed [23]. The proposed approach is that the
network traffic data is ”projected” into the image. Accumulating inage chanfes
gives us a video stream, analyzing which, we can make a conclusion about the
anomalous state of the observed data network.
The basis of any anomaly detection system is a module that analyzes net-
work packets and decides on their potential maliciousness. In fact, ADS is trying
to classify network traffic into two subsets: normal traffic and network attacks
(it doesn’t even matter which detection technology is used signature-based or
statistical). Consequently, the very concept of ADS is in very good agreement
with the goals of image classification algorithms - matching the original image
to a class of images from a set according to some features. Moreover, image clas-
sification as a mathematical tool for analyzing network traffic data and detect-
ing network attacks has several advantages compared to the anomaly detection
methods discussed earlier. These advantages are represented below.
– The mathematical apparatus for the classification of images is well developed
and tested in practice in many other areas of science and technology.
– A large number of image classification algorithms and wide possibilities for
their improvement make this mathematical apparatus very flexible and pro-
vide an extensive potential for increasing the efficiency of network intrusion
detection.
– Most image classification algorithms, showing high practical efficiency, are
relatively easy to understand and implement in software.
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– Image classification is very effective even with very large amounts of input
data. This fact makes us consider these methods as especially suitable for
analyzing large network traffic dumps.
– Classification of images can be applied even in the absence of a priori infor-
mation about the importance of particular network packet features in the
context of detecting certain types of network attacks.
– Interpretation of the results is fairly simple and intuitive.
3.1 Image representation of multidimensional TCP/IP traffic data
The authors propose to solve the problem of representing network traffic meta-
data in the way which will allow using the pattern recognition algorithm to
detect anomalies in the video stream.
Consider the network terminal device collecting traffic in the virtual channel.
Each collected packet has a set of metadata, presented as a vector p:
p(id, date, x1, x2, . . . , xn), p ∈ P,
where n is a vector dimension, P is a set of all vectors, id is a session identifier,
date is a timestamp of logging by the terminal, x1, . . . , xn - direction, adresses
and ports of sender and receiver, packet size, protocol type, timestamp (as in
TCP segment header), different flags and service fields.
To project traffic into an image, the orthogonal projection method is used
[24]: each vector p is represented by a point in multidimensional space, where n
is the dimension of space, then all points (packets) belonging to one session are
projected into two-dimensional space:
X ′ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(a¯a¯) (a¯b¯) a
(b¯a¯) (b¯b¯) b
X¯ × a¯ X¯ × b¯ 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣(a¯a¯) (a¯b¯)(b¯a¯) (b¯b¯)
∣∣∣∣
where a, b are empirically achieved basis vectors for the projection into the
two-dimensional space, X is a source vector, constructed from p by removing id
and date elements, X ′ is a projection result, × is a cross product, () is a scalar
product.
The next stage of the network session imaging is the connection of all its
points, forming a convex figure. The last step is to fill the resulting shape with
color. Then everything is repeated for the next network session. The resulting
image is obtained when the imaging process has been performed for all network
sessions intercepted by the terminal. Accumulating changes or differentiating
this image gives us a video stream. Fig. 1 shows examples of images that reflect
the legitimate (”normal state”) network behavior.
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Fig. 1.
3.2 Image classification in the problem of anomaly detection
The next step is to solve the problem of classifying the obtained image. In
general, the solution to the task of detecting classes (objects) in an image is
to use machine learning algorithms for building class models, and then output
algorithms to search for classes (objects) in an image.
Building a model has two stages:
a) Extraction of characteristic features for a class: construction of characteristic
feature vectors for class elements.
b) Training on the obtained features of the model for subsequent recognition
tasks.
The description of the class object is carried out using feature vectors. Vectors
are built from:
a) color information (oriented gradient histogram);
b) contextual information;
c) data on the geometric interposition of object parts.
The classification (prediction) algorithm can be divided into two stages:
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a) Extracting features from an image. At this stage, two tasks are performed:
• Since the image can contain objects of many classes, we need to find all
the representatives. To do this,one might use a sliding window, which
runs through the image from the upper left to the lower right corner.
• The image is scaled, since the scale of the objects in an image may vary.
b) Associating an image with a specific class. A formal class description, i.e. a
set of features that are highlighted by their test images, is used as an input
data. Based on this information, the classifier decides whether the image
belongs to the class and assesses the degree of reliability for the conclusion.
Classification methods. Classification methods range from mostly heuristic
approaches to formal procedures based on the methods of mathematical statis-
tics. There is no generally accepted classification, but a number of approaches
to image classification can be distinguished:
– methods of part-based object modeling;
– ”bag-of-words” methods;
– spatial pyramid matching methods.
For implementation presented in this article the authors chose the bag-of-words
algorithm, considering the following reasons:
– The algorithms of the parts-based modeling and spatial pyramid matching
are sensitive to the position of the descriptors in space and their mutual
arrangement. These classes of methods are effective in the tasks of detecting
objects in an image; however, due to the characteristic features of the input
data, they are poorly applicable to the problem of image classification.
– The bag-of-words algorithm is widely tested in other areas of knowledge, it
shows good results and is simple enough to implement.
To analyze the video stream projected from the traffic, we used a naive Bayes
classifier [25]. It is often used to classify texts with the bag-of-words model. In
this case, the approach is similar to the analysis of texts, only descriptors are
used instead of words. The work of this classifier can be divided into two parts:
the training phase and the prediction phase.
Training phase. Each frame (image) is fed to the input of the descriptor
search algorithm, in this case the scale-invariant feature transform (SIFT)[26].
After that, the task of correlating singular points between frames is performed.
A singular point on the image of an object is a point that will most likely appear
on other images of this object.
To solve the problem of comparing the singular points of an object in different
images, a descriptor is used. Descriptor is a data structure, identifier of a singular
point, distinguishing it from the rest. It may or may not be invariant w.r.t.
image transformations of the object. In this case, the descriptor is invariant
w.r.t. perspective transformations, i.e. scaling. The descriptor allows to compare
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a singular point of the object in one image with the same singular point on
another image of this object.
Next, the set of descriptors obtained from all images is ordered into groups
by similarity using the k-means clustering method [26,?]. This is done in order
to train the classifier, which will issue a conclusion about whether the image
represents anomalous behavior.
Below is a step-by-step algorithm for training the image descriptor classifier:
Step 1. Extraction of all descriptors from sets with attack and without attack.
Step 2. K-means clustering of all descriptors into n clusters.
Step 3. Calculation of the matrix A(m, k), where m is the number of images and
k is the number of clusters. The element (i; j) will store the value of how
frequently the descriptors from the j-th cluster appears on the i-th image.
Such a matrix will be called the appearance frequency matrix.
Step 4. Calculation of descriptor weights using tfidf formula 1
tfidf(t, d,D) = tf(t, d) ∗ idf(t,D)
Here tf (”term frequency”) is the frequency of occurrence of the descriptor
in this image and is defined as
tf(t, d) =
nt∑
k
nk
,
where t is a descriptor, k is the number of descriptors in an image, nt is an
amount of descriptor t in an image. Also, idf (”inverse document frequency”)
is the reverse frequency of the image with the given descriptor in the sample
and is defined as
idf(t,D) = log
D
{di ∈ D, t ∈ di} ,
where D is the number of images with the given descriptor in the sample,{di ∈
D, t ∈ di} is the number of images in D where t is found under the conditions
of nt 6= 0.
Step 5. Substituting corresponding weights instead of descriptors into the matrix A.
Step 6. Classification. We use the boosting (adaboost) of naive Bayes classifiers.
Step 7. Saving the trained model to a file.
Step 8. THis concludes the training phase.
Prediction phase. The differences between the training phase and the predic-
tion phase are small: descriptors are extracted from the image and related to the
groups at hand. Based on this relationship, a vector is constructed. Each element
of this vector is the frequency of occurrence of descriptors from this group in
the image. Analyzing this vector, the classifier can make a prediction about an
attack with a certain probability.
General algorithm for prediction based on a pair of classifiers is presented
below.
1 Wu H., Luk R., Wong K., and Kwok K.: Interpreting TF-IDF term weights as making
relevance decisions. ACM Transactions on Information Systems, vol. 26, no. 3, (2008)
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Step 1. Extraction of all descriptors from the image;
Step 2. Clustering the resulting set of descriptors;
Step 3. Calculation of the vector [1, k];
Step 4. Calculation of the weight for each descriptor by the tfidf formula presented
above;
Step 5. Replacing the frequency of occurrence in vectors with their weight;
Step 6. Classification of the resulting vector by a previously trained classifier;
Step 7. Conclusion about the presense of an anomaly in the observed network based
on the prediction of the classifier.
4 Detection efficiency evaluation
The task of evaluating the efficiency of the proposed method was solved ex-
perimentally. The experiment used a number of parameters set empirically. 1000
clusters were used for clustering. The generated images were 1000 by 1000 pixels.
4.1 Experimental dataset
A setup was assembled for the experiments. It consists of three devices connected
by a communication channel. The block diagram of the setup is shown in Figure
2.
Fig. 2.
The SRV device plays the role of a server under attack (hereinafter referred
to as the target server). As the target server, the devices listed in Table 1 with
the code SRV were used sequentially. The second is a network device designed
to transfer network packets. Characteristics of the device are shown in Table 1
under the code ND-1.
On target servers, network packets were captured to a PCAP file for later
use in detection algorithms. For this task, the tcpdump utility was used. The
datasets are described in table 2.
The following software was used on target servers: Linux distribution, nginx
1.10.3 web server, postgresql 9.6 DBMS. To emulate system load a special web
application was written. The application requests a database with a large amount
of data. The request is designed to minimize the use of various caching. Through
the experiments the requests to this web application were generated.
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Table 1. Network device characteristics
Code Description RAM,
MB
Network
interface,
Mbps
Disk
drive,
GB
Disk
type
Processor
SRV-1 Acer Atom
Nettop
2048 100 60 SSD 2x2GHz Intel
Atom D525
SRV-2 virtual host 6144 100 70 SSD 8x2GHz Intel
Xeon E7-4850
SRV-3 virtual host
(KVM)
512 1000 10 HDD 2GHz QEMU
Virtual CPU
ND-1 WR842ND
router
32 100 .008 Flash 535MHz
MIPS 74Ks
Table 2. Sets of captured network packets
Code Filename Server DDoS Time
of
record,
min
No. of packets Dump size
D1 calm network SRV-1 No 71 2950108 2.8Gb
D2 empty net 247 SRV-2 No 71 87306 15Mb
D3 empty net SRV-3 No 17 163950 11Mb
D4 pretty loaded SRV-3 Yes 13 53244 54Mb
D5 loaded SRV-1 Yes 12 2949244 433Mb
D6 loaded 2 SRV-2 Yes 5 589706 403Mb
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The attack was generated from the third client device (Table 1) using the
Apache Benchmark utility. The structure of the background traffic during the
attack and during the rest of the time is presented in Table 3.
Table 3. Background traffic features
Code Protocols Traffic datasets
BT-1 bittorrent D1, D5
BT-2 ssh All datasets
BT-3 http D1, D3, D4, D5
BT-4 https D2, D6
As an attack we implement a version of the HTTP GET-flood distributed
DoS. Such an attack is essentially a generation of constant stream of GET re-
quests, in this case from the CD-1 device. To generate it, we used the ab utility
from the apache-utils package. As a result, files containing information about the
state of the network were obtained. The main features of these files are presented
in table 2. The main parameters of the attack scenario are listed in table 4.
Table 4. DDoS attack features
Code Dataset code Requests processed Speed, pps Avg. processing time, ms
A-1 D4 900 15.90 29201
A-2 D5 8300 24.45 18120
A-3 D6 9950 31.20 16023
From the resulting network traffic dump, sets of the generated images TD#1
and TD#2, which were used for the training phase, were obtained. The sample
TD#3 was used for the prediction phase. A summary of the test datasets is
presented in Table 5.
Table 5. Test image datasets
Image type Test data TD#1 Test data TD#2 Test data TD#3
Legitimate 1500 images 3000 images 1000 images
With DDoS 500 images 1500 images 1000 images
Total 2000 images 4500 images 2000 images
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4.2 Efficiency criteria
The main parameters evaluated through the course of this research were:
a) DR (Detection Rate) - the number of detected attacks in relation to the
total number of attacks. The higher this parameter, the higher the efficiency
and quality of ADS.
b) FPR (False Positive Rate) - the number of ”normal” objects, mistakenly
classified as an attack, in relation to the total number of ”normal” ob-
jects. The lower this parameter, the higher the efficiency and quality of the
anomaly detection system.
c) CR (Complex rate) is a complex indicator that takes into account the com-
bination of DR and FPR parameters. Since, as part of the study, the DR
and FPR parameters were taken to be of equal importance, the complex
indicator was calculated as follows: CR = DR+FPR2 .
The classifier was fed 1000 images marked as ”anomalous”. Based on the
recognition performance, DR was calculated depending on the size of the training
sample. The following values were obtained: for TD#1 DR = 9.5% and for
TD#2 DR = 98.4%. Next, the second half of the images (the ”normal” ones)
were classified. Based on the result, FPR was calculated (for TD#1 FPR =
3.2% and for TD#2 FPR = 4.3%). Thus, the following comprehensive efficiency
indicators were obtained: for TD#1 CR = 53.15% and for TD#2 CR = 97, 05%.
5 Conclusions and future research
It can be seen from the experimental results that the proposed method for de-
tecting anomalies shows high results in the detection of attacks. E.g., on a large
sample, the value of the complex efficiency indicator reaches 97%. However, this
method has some limitations in its application:
1. The values of DR and FPR show the sensitivity of the algorithm to the size
of the training set, which is a conceptual problem for machine learning algo-
rithms. Increasing the sample results in improved detection rates. However,
it is not always possible to implement a sufficiently large training sample for
a specific network.
2. The developed algorithm is deterministic, the same image is classified each
time with the same result.
3. The efficiency indicators of the approach are good enough for proof of con-
cept, but the number of false positives is also large, which can lead to the
difficulties of practical implementation.
To overcome the limitation described above (item 3), it is supposed to change
the naive Bayesian classifier to a convolutional neural network, which, accord-
ing to the authors, should lead to an increase in the accuracy of the anomaly
detection algorithm.
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